GO, OR NO-GO? REJECTED TAKE-OFFS....

Acknowledgements: UK CAA “GA CLUED UP”

Ed. Note: The following is extracted from this month’s bulletin (January 2023)

“Most, if not all, pilots will be prepared for an engine failure on take-off, but not all issues are so clear cut. It happens very quickly, though it can feel as if time has slowed right down... You open the throttle, speed starts to build, your thoughts are ahead for rotation into the air and then something just isn’t quite right or, worse, starts going badly wrong — do you carry on, or stop?

Sitting on the ground reading this you’ll instinctively say, “You stop if there’s room, that’s obvious...”. That’s true in the cool, calm of home or the briefing room, but in a busy (and possibly noisy) cockpit with things starting to happen quite quickly it can be completely different as precious runway distance is eaten up while your mind is trying to decide what’s going on and what to do about it.

Take this extract from a recent AAIB report:

·       ‘The pilot reported that after applying full power to depart from the grass runway the aircraft yawed left “slightly more than usual” [There was a crosswind at the time]. ‘He countered it with right rudder and brake, expecting rudder would compensate for the yaw as airspeed increased. However, later in the take-off roll, even with full right rudder and right brake applied, the aircraft began departing left of the runway surface. ‘The pilot described reaching a “critical point” whereby to avoid damage related to a runway excursion, and with the aircraft “nearing its take-off speed”, he stopped applying right brake and rotated the aircraft into the air. It became airborne briefly but touched down adjacent to the runway and struck a raised earth bank’.

·       Thankfully the pilot was uninjured, though that can’t be said for the aircraft which had a fractured fuselage, a damaged prop and main wings that had twisted on the spar. The report goes on to say: ‘The wet and cool weather conditions preceding the accident may have meant the grass was unexpectedly wet, affecting the aircraft’s handling characteristics. If, as the pilot suggested, the left brake was binding, the left yawing tendency may have exceeded the available aerodynamic control. ‘In order to prevent a runway excursion, the pilot rotated the aircraft before its take-off speed had been reached, probably causing one or both wings to stall. He had not considered stopping’.

That last sentence is crucial:

·       The pilot had ‘habitually considered his actions in the event of an engine failure after take-off. However, like others consulted during the investigation, he had not recently considered the decision-making aspect of the take-off roll, or his intended actions for rejecting a take-off. He could not recall any training he may have received in those areas.’

·       During the investigation the AAIB interviewed several PPL holders, Flight instructors and Flight Instructor/Examiners and it became apparent that training and awareness of rejected take-offs and related decision-making ‘was variable’. Several long-term PPL holders couldn’t recall initial rejected take-off training, nor refresher training for it.

·       All the instructors interviewed indicated that pilots commonly focus on “getting into the air”, rather than considering a rejected take-off when preparing to take-off.

·       Abandoned take-offs are of course taught in the PPL syllabus in Exercise 12/13, but training can be varied, and you might not choose to cover it in your biennial check.

So where does all that leave us?

The first and perhaps most important point is to pre-plan a ‘go, no-go’ point, appropriate for the conditions of the day, on or to the side of the runway, which leaves enough room to stop if things aren’t working out ....”

FLY SAFE!